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THE VALIDATION OF ERRONEOUSLY
LOCATED BOUNDARIES BY ADVERSE
POSSESSION AND RELATED
DOCTRINES
JAMEs

W. DAY*

The corners and lines actually established in a survey constitute
the boundaries of the various units of the survey and of tracts within
the survey that subsequently are conveyed with reference to the survey or to a plat of it., These corners and lines, as long as their location can be ascertained, prevail over inconsistent calls for courses and
distances shown in the field notes of the original surveyor or in the
plat made of the survey. 2 They so control, too, even when through
error in the original survey they have been fixed in such a manner as
to create units that deviate markedly in size, shape, or otherwise from
the norm intended by the survey.3 These principles are applicable
both to private surveys 4 and to the government survey. 5
All too frequently, the monuments erected or described to designate these original corners become lost or obliterated. Similarly, the
respective owners lose sight of the boundaries established between
adjacent tracts by the descriptions employed as they are conveyed.
The result in each of these situations often is that one of these owners
*B.S. 1914, A.M. 1916, B.S. in Education 1917, University of Missouri; J.D. 1927,
University of Florida; Professor of Law, University of Florida.
'Accord, Akin v. Godwin, 49 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1950); see 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §12.116 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §994 (3d
ed. 1939).
2See 3 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §12.116 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 TIFFANY, op.
cit. supra note I, § §991, 994.
3Galt v. Willingham, 11 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1926) (applying law of Florida); 3
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §12.116 (Casner ed. 1952).
43 AbmRICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §12.116 (Casner ed. 1952).
5Galt v. Willingham, supra note 3; see 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §12.116
(Casner ed. 1952); 4 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, §§991, 994.
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occupies land beyond his true boundary. 6 His ownership of this strip
and the substitution of his erroneously located boundary for the original boundary can be established in a proper situation by adverse possession; by agreement of the parties as to the location of an uncertain
or disputed boundary, followed by occupancy by them to the agreed
boundary; and by acquiescence. It is to an exploration of the application and technicalities of these doctrines that this article is directed.
VALIDATION BY ADVERSE POSSESSION

For many centuries it has been provided by statute that an owner
whose land has been possessed by another in a designated manner for
a specified period cannot maintain an action for its recovery., Although most of these statutes do not expressly state that a possession
of the type in question perfects title in the possessor, they are all so
construed as to effectuate that result.8
The period of adverse possession necessary to vest title in the possessor varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Florida this period
is seven years, 9 subject to the qualification that if the true owner is a
minor, insane, or imprisoned at the time the adverse possession begins
he can recover his land by bringing an action within seven years after
the disability in question terminates.1° An adverse possession for
6

1n construing an ambiguous description in a conveyance, recourse can be had
to the construction placed upon it by the adjoining owners as shown by their respective occupancies. Williamson v. Pratt, 37 Cal. App. 363, 174 Pac. 114 (1918);
French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. *439 (1831).
7E.g., Statute of Westminster I, 3 EDw. 1, c. 39 (1275); Act of Limitation, 32
HEN. 8, c. 2 (1540); Act for Limitation of Actions, 21 JAC. 1, c. 16, §§1-2 (1623);
FLA. STAT. §§95.12,.14,.16-19 (1955). All American jurisdictions have enacted such
statutes. The English statute last cited would be in effect in Florida if no Florida
statutes on the subject had been enacted. FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1955).
sE.g., School Dist. v. Benson, 31 Me. 381 (1850); see Ames, The Disseisin of
Chattels, 3 HARv. L. REv. 313, 318 (1890). FLA. STAT. §95.14 (1955), contrary to the
practice usual in such statutes, seems to state, albeit with obscurity, that an adverse
possession for the necessary period vests the title in the adverse possessor.
9FA. STAT. §§95.12,.14,.16,.18
(1955). The period has been seven years in
Florida since 1872 with the exception that in the case of an adverse possession without color of title a period of twenty years was required from the effective date of
Fla. Laws 1895, c. 4412 until Aug. 1, 1901, the effective date of Fla. Laws 1901, c.
4916. Baugher v. Boley, 63 Fla. 75, 58 So. 980 (1912). In Florida, however, an
adverse possession of four years by the holder of an invalid tax deed to the land
will vest the title in him. FLA. STAT. §196.06 (1955).
10FLA. STAT. §95.20 (1955). It is only a disability to which an owner is subject
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thirty years, however, confers title in Florida even as against owners
who are under these disabilities when the adverse possession begins."1
An Adverse PossessionMust Be Actual, Open, Continuous,
Exclusive, and Hostile
The mere lapse of the statutory period does not confer title on an
alleged possessor. For this result to follow, it is necessary that the possession of the land be actual, open, continuous, exclusive, and hostile.' 2 This requirement is applicable to all instances in which it is
claimed that title has been acquired by adverse possession, including
those in which a landowner occupies land of another beyond his
own true boundary.
For possession to be actual it must be a real possession as distinct
from a mere claim of ownership. The statutes of the various jurisdictions usually specify the kinds of possessory acts that are sifficient to
constitute adverse possession without color of title and under color
of title respectively. In Florida33 and most states' 4 a possessor has
adverse possession under color of title only when he or someone under
whom he claims enters into possession under a claim of title founded
upon a writing purporting to convey the land or upon the decree
or judgment of a competent court. An adverse possession commencat the time the possession adverse to him begins that keeps the statutory period
from starting to run. FLA. STAT. §§95.05,.20 (1955): Gillespie v. Florida Mtge. &
Inv. Co., 96 Fla. 35, 117 So. 708 (1928); Doyle v. Wade, 23 Fla. 90, 1 So. 516 (1887);
Wade v. Doyle, 17 Fia. 522 (1880).
1FLA. STAT. §95.20 (1955).
12See 4 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, §§1135, 1137, 1140-42, 1145; cf. 3
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 15.3 (Casner ed. 1952).
"3FLA. STAT. §95.16 (1955). A possessor who claims under an instrument that
does not describe the land does not have color of title. Boley v. McMillan, 66 Fla.
159, 63 So. 703 (1913); Jackson v. Woodruff, 1 Cow. 276 '(N.Y. 1823); Mitchell v.
Moore, 152 Fla. 843, 845, 13 So.2d 314, 315 (1943) (dictum). The mere fact that
an instrument is void, however, does not prevent it from giving color of title.
Bradley & Hale Fishery Co. v. Thomas, 93 Fla. 326, 112 So. 55 (1927) (void tax
deed); Douglass v. Aldridge, 90 Fla. 51, 105 So. 145 (1925) (void tax deed); Keech
v. Enriquez, 28 Fla. 597, 10 So. 91 (1891) (void deed).
14E.g., Jackson v. Woodruff, supra note 13; see Annot., 2 A.L.R. 1457 (1919).
A-minority view is followed in a few jurisdictions, however, to the effect that a
possessor has color of title even in the absence of a writing when he indicates the
extent of his claim either by placing markers at the comers of the tract or in
some other manner. E.g., Bell v. Hartley, 4 W. & S.32 (Pa. 1842); see Annot., 2
A.L.R. 1457, 1460-61 (1919).
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ing in Florida after December 31, 1945, furthermore, is not deemed
to be under color of title until the possessor duly records the instrument upon which the claim of title is founded.' 5
Title cannot be obtained in Florida by adverse possession when
the possessor does not have color of title unless the land has either
been protected by a substantial inclosure or has been "usually cultivated or improved."' 16 An inclosure is substantial only when it is
generally sufficient to turn cattle."1 For this purpose, however, it is
unnecessary that the inclosure be of such a character as to render absolutely impossible a break at any time by any cow at any place
throughout its course.' 8 A fence that is in the process of construction
does not become a substantial inclosure until it is completed.-9
Land is of course improved when a structure has been erected
upon it. The Florida Court has held that reclaiming submerged
land, building a house part of which extends upon it, planting some
trees, and covering it with black soil constitutes an improvement; 20
and it has cited 2' with approval a Tennessee decision" which held
that an owner had sufficiently improved a strip of land belonging to
another by paving it to provide a means of access to his store. It
seems clear that the mere pasturing of land in the normal manner does
not involve an inclosure, cultivation, or improvement of it.
A possessor of Florida land under color of title has effective possession when he protects it by a substantial inclosure or cultivates or
improves it in accordance with the definitions of those terms in the
two preceding paragraphs. 23 He has such possession also when he uses
the land for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for the purpose of
husbandry, or for the ordinary use of the occupant. 24 And when he
15FLA. STAT. §95.16 (1955).
16FLA. STAT. §95.19 (1955), Baugher v. Boley, 63 Fla. 75, 58 So. 980 (1912).

This
requirement has been in effect since 1872. Fla. Laws 1872, c. 1869, §8.
"7Adams v. Fryer, 59 Fla. 112, 52 So. 611 (1910) (alternative holding). Other
jurisdictions accept this concept as to what constitutes a substantial inclosure.
Sharrock v. Ritter, 45 S.W. 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898); cf. Polack v. McGrath, 32
Cal. 15 (1867).
'sSharrock v. Ritter, supra note 17; cf. Baugher v. Boley, supra note 16; Polack
v. McGrath, 32 Cal. 15, 22 (1867) (dictum).
19Baugher v. Boley, 63 Fla. 75, 58 So. 980 (1912).
2oSt. Petersburg v. Meloche, 92 Fla. 770, 110 So. 341 (1926) (alternative holding).
2-id. at 773, 110 So. at 342.
2fBensdorff v. Uihlein, 132 Tenn. 193, 177 S.W. 481 (1915).
23FLA. STAT.

§95.17 (1955).

"4Ibid.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1957], Art. 1
ERRONEOUSLY LOCATED BOUNDARIES
incloses, cultivates, or improves part of a known lot or single farm
to all of which he has color of tide, he is deemed to have possession
also of the portion not so occupied if it accords with the land-utilization policy of the place and time in question to leave that proportion
2 5

of it unused.

2SIbid. An actual possession of a lot or farm under color of title does not give
the possessor constructive possession of another lot or farm to which his color of
title extends. Okeechobee Co. v. Norton, 145 Fla. 417, 199 So. 319 (1940). This
rule is in effect in most jurisdictions. Morris v. McClary, 43 Minn. 346, 46 N.W.
238 (1890); Pepper v. O'Dowd, 39 Wis. 538 (1876); Note, 6 CoLUM. L. Rav. 582
(1906); cf. Thompson v. Burhans, 61 N.Y. *52 (1874); Simpson & Isaacs v. Downing,
23 Wend. 316, 322 (N.Y. 1840) (dictum); Bailey v. Carleton, 12 N.H. 9, 16 (1841)
(dictum). In this connection, it has been held in Florida that a quarter quarter section containing forty acres and not otherwise divided into lots can be regarded as a
single lot or farm. Kendrick v. Latham, 25 Fla. 819, 6 So. 871 (1889). It is not
to be inferred from this decision, however, that a tract of forty acres is the maximum size to which the doctrine is applicable. In a few jurisdictions it has been
held, usually in early cases involving land in sparsely settled regions, that an occupant's actual possession of a reasonable portion of another's otherwise vacant tract,
to all of which the occupant has color of title, vests in him a constructive possession of the unoccupied portion even when the tract is much larger than those
usually occupied as farms. E.g., Gunn v. Bates, 6 Cal. 263 (1856).
In some jurisdictions it has been held that an adverse possessor does not acquire
constructive possession of the unoccupied portion of the tract to which he has
color of title unless he uses it in some subsidiary way in connection with the part
that he actually occupies. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Gulf of Mexico Land & Improv.
Co., 82 Miss. 180, 33 So. 845 (1903) (alternative holding); cf. Thompson v. Burhans,
79 N.Y. 093 (1879). Seemingly this requirement of a subsidiary use is not in effect in
Florida when the leaving of such a portion entirely unused accords with the landutilization policy of the community at the time in question. FA. STAT. §95.17
(1955).
When a claimant takes actual possession of a part of a single lot or farm to
all of which he has color of title, and at the time of his entry the true owner of
the lot or farm is in the actual possession of another part of it, the actual possession of the latter carries with it the constructive possession of the portion not occupied by either. Wilkins v. Pensacola City Co., 36 Fla. 36, 18 So. 20 (1895); accord,
Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U.S. 333 (1880); Ritchie v. Owsley, 143 Ky. 1, 135 S.W. 439
(1911); Jackson v. Vermilyea, 6 Cow. 677 (N.Y. 1827); Altemus v. Long, 4 Pa.
254 (1846); Clarke v. Courtney, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 319, 354 (1831) (dictum). Even
a taking of possession of a part of the unit by the true owner subsequent to the
entry of the adverse claimant vests the constructive possession of the unoccupied
portion in the true owner. Hunnicutt v. Peyton, supra; Ritchie v. OwsIey, supra;
Altemus v. Long, supra. A similar question is presented when an adverse claimant
who has color of title to a part of a vacant tract belonging to another takes possession of only a portion of the land to which his color of title extends and subsequently the true owner takes possession of a part of his larger tract that lies
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One who encroaches upon land beyond his boundary ordinarily
does not have a written instrument or a judgment or decree purporting to vest in him the title to the encroachment. Normally, therefore, the possessory acts upon which he relies must be sufficient to
constitute adverse possession without color of title.
The possession of a claimant is open when it is of such a nature
that the owner of the land obtains knowledge of the possession or
will obtain knowledge of it if he keeps himself reasonably informed
of the status of his property.2 6 Actual knowledge by him of the adverse
possession is unnecessary, however. 27 Similarly, it is unnecessary that
the possession otherwise be open when the landowner knows of it.28
A clandestine or secret possession is of course insufficient to start the
statutory period to run.29 Thus one who secretly enters on subsurface coal through an opening in land other than that in which the
coal is situated obtains no title to the coal by adverse possession.30
And one who secretly uses the portion of a cave beneath the land of
another by entering it from an opening on other land acquires no
31
right by adverse possession.
It is often stated in Florida cases3 2 and in those from other jurisdictions 33 that an adverse possession must be "open and notorious."
When "open" is defined as in the preceding paragraph, however, it
beyond that to which the adverse claimant has color of title. Some jurisdictions
hold that this subsequent possession of the true owner gives him constructive possession of the unoccupied portion of the land to which the adverse claimant has
color of title and of which the adverse claimant therefore had constructive possession until the entry of the true owner. Hunnicutt v. Peyton, supra; Altemus v.
Long, supra; Note, 6 COLUM. L. REV. 582 (1906). Some jurisdictions hold to the
contrary. Ritchie v. Owsley, supra; Fox v. Hinton, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 559 (1817);
Stull v. Ritch Patch Iron Co., 92 Va. 253, 23 S.E. 293 (1895); Garrett v. Ramsey,
26 W. Va. 345 (1885) (decided by a divided court).
26Cf., e.g., Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 14 So. 805 (1894); Dempsey v.
Burns, 281 Ill. 644, 118 N.E. 193 (1917); Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 212 Ind. 624, 10
N.E.2d 917 (1937); see 4 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, §1140.
2
7Mann v. Mann, 353 Mo. 619, 183 S.W.2d 557 (1944).
2
sKornegay v. Montgomery, 194 Miss. 274, 12 So.2d 423 (1943); Mann v. Mann,
supra note 27; Pease v. Whitney, 78 N.H. 201, 98 At. 62 (1916).
29Hynds v. Hynds, 274 Mo. 123, 202 S.W. 387 (1918); Pierce v. Barney, 209 Pa.
132, 58 At. 152 (1904).
30Pierce v. Barney, 209 Pa. 132, 58 At. 152 (1904).
3lMarengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 212 Ind. 624, 10 N.E.2d 917 (1937).
32E.g., Douglass v. Aldridge, 90 Fla. 51, 53, 105 So. 145, 146 (1925); Horton
v. Smith-Richardson Inv. Co., 81 Fla. 255, 262, 87 So. 905, 908 (1921).
33E.g., Kornegay v. Montgomery, 194 Miss. 274, 281, 12 So.2d 423, 425 (1943).
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embraces everything that is embodied in the expression "open and
notorious."
An adverse possession must be continuous. 34 Occasional acts of
entry upon the land35 or desultory logging operations there3 6 do not
ripen into title by adverse possession. What constitutes the continuity of possession necessary for this purpose depends largely upon
the circumstances of each case as it arises.37 The use to which the
property is adapted, the use that is made of it, the circumstances and
situation of the possessor, and to a certain extent his intention must
be considered in this connection.3 8 In Britt v. Houser,39 for example,
the land in question was situated on the bank of a river and was subject to such periodic overflows as to make it impracticable to keep it
continuously in cultivation or enclosed by fencing. During the running of the statutory period, the adverse claimant kept the land
wholly or partly enclosed by fences except for a few years when the
fences were washed away. He raised crops on the land at different
times, although there were years when he made no attempt to do so.
He cut timber on the land when he wanted it and sometimes used
the land for pasture. It was held that these acts of ownership satisfied the requirement of continuity, since they were all that a true
owner could reasonably be expected to exercise over land of this
kind.
Similarly, adverse possession of land by a school district for the
period of time each year that school is conducted there is sufficiently
continuous. 40 With respect to all kinds of property, however, there
must be such continuity of possession as will give notice that a claim
hostile to the true title is being asserted;41 and a voluntary abandon34Spradling v. May, 259 Ala. 10, 65 So.2d 494 (1953);. Horton v. Smith-Richardson Inv. Co., 81 Fla. 255, 87 So. 905 (1921); Doyle v. Wade, 23 Fla. 90, 1 So. 516

(1887).
3sSpradling v. May, 259 Ala. 10, 65 So.2d 494 (1953).
361bid.; Berry v. Perdido Realty Co., 84 Fla. 134, 93 So. 131 (1922); Clark v.
Cochran, 79 Fla. 788, 85 So. 250 (1920); cf. Little v. Kendrick, 152 Fla. 720, 12
So.2d 899 (1943); Hyer v. Griffin, 55 Fla. 560, 46 So. 635 (1908).
37Horton v. Smith-Richardson Inv. Co., supra note 34; Doyle v. Wade, supra
note 34; Britt v. Houser, 171 Ky. 494, 188 S.W. 628 (1916); cf. Ewing v. Burnett,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41 (1837); Davis v. Haines, 349 Ill. 622, 182 N.E. 718 (1932).
3sSee note 37 supra.
30171 Ky. 494, 188 S.W. 628 (1916).
-40Singleton v. School Dist., 10 Ky. L. Rep. 851, 10 S.W. 793 (1889); Britt v.
Houser, 171 Ky. 494, 498, 188 S.W. 628, 630 (1916) (dictum).
4lBritt v. Houser, 171 Ky. 494, 499, 188 S.W. 628, 630 (1916) (dictum).
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ment of the premises by the claimant for any period, however short,
without an intention to return, is a breach in the continuity of pos4

session. 2
An adverse possession must be exclusive. 4 3 If it coexists with the

4
possession of another acting independently, it cannot ripen into title. 4
Two or more individuals can, however, have a single adverse possession that will develop into some species of co-ownership.45
An adverse possession must be hostile.46 The term "hostile" as
used in this connection merely imports that the claimant is in possession under a claim of ownership in contradistinction to holding in
4
recognition of or in subordination to the title of the true owner. 1
A possession can be hostile in this sense even though no enmity or
ill will exists between the claimant and the true owner. 4s A possession of land under an oral gift of the title in fee, for example, is hostile to the donor, 49 although in such situations the most amicable relations usually prevail between the parties. Similarly, a possession
under an invalid written conveyance of the fee is hostile to the gran-

tor.50

The fact that a possession is hostile to the true title can be

effectively manifested by the actions of the possessor without the aid
of an express declaration of ownership by him.51
42Doyle v. Wade, 23 Fla. 90, 97, 1 So. 516, 520 (1887) (dictum).
43Sanders v. Alford Bros. Co., 92 Fla. 718, 111 So. 278 (1926); Hynds v. Hynds,
274 Mo. 123, 202 S.W. 387 (1918); accord, Briley v. Winter, 111 Fla. 501, 149 So.
602 (1933); Bailey v. Carleton, 12 N.H. 9 (1841).
44Ward v. Cochran, 150 U.S. 597 (1893); Sparrow v. Hovey, 44 Mich. 63 (1880);
Proprietors of Kennebeck Purchase v. Springer, 4 Mass. 416, 418 (1808) (dictum);
Murphy v. Doyle, 37 Minn. 113, 115, 33 N.W. 220, 221 (1887) (dictum); McCaughn
v. Young, 85 Miss. 277, 291, 37 So. 839, 841 (1905) (dictum).
45Accord, Britt v. Houser, 171 Ky. 494, 188 S.W. 628 (1916); Schell v. Williams
Valley R.R., 35 Pa. 191 (1860).
46McDowell v. Hutto, 223 Ala. 307, 135 So. 322 (1931); Levering v. Tarpon
Springs, 92 So.2d 638 (Fla. 1957); Bank of Eagle v. Morrison, 197 Wis. 40, 221 N.W.
383 (1928); accord, Ellwood v. Stallcup, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 343, 122 S.W. 906 (1909);
Douglass v. Aldridge, 90 Fla. 51, 53, 105 So. 145, 146 (1925) (dictum).
47Mittet v. Hansen, 178 Wash. 541, 35 P.2d 93 (1934); Pacific Power & Light
Co. v. Bailey, 160 Wash. 663, 295 Pac. 943 (1931); King v. Bassindale, 127 Wash.
189, 220 Pac. 777 (1923).
48See note 47 supra.
49Bridwell v. McGrew, 228 Ky. 334, 14 S.W.2d 1085 (1929); Reader v. Williams,
216 S.W. 738 (Mo. 1919).
5OMontgomery v. Carlton, 99 Fla. 152, 126 So. 135 (1930); Bronston v. Davidson's
Trustee, 11 Ky. Op. 672 (1882); Vandergrifft v. Cox, 8 Ky. Op. 334, 335 (1875)
(dictum).
5lBlackfoot Land Dev. Co. v. Burke, 60 Mont. 544, 551, 199 Pac. 685, 687 (1921)
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Since a possession cannot be adverse unless it is hostile, it of course
follows that a permissive possession cannot constitute the basis of a
title by adverse possession.5 2 A possession is permissive, for example,
when it is under a permission or license based on an agreement with
53
the true owner or his agent.
Until the contrary is proved, the owner of the legal title to real
property is presumed, according to the great weight of American authority, to have possession of it; and occupation of the premises by any
other person is deemed to be in subordination to the legal title unless
it is shown that such is not the case.54 These presumptions are in55
corporated in the statutes of a number of the states.
The burden of proving the various characteristics that are necessary to make a possession adverse, including hostility of possession,
rests upon the alleged adverse possessor.56 When the evidence is conflicting as to the facts that determine whether the possession was hostile to the true tide, the question as to the existence of those facts
is one for the trier of the fact. 57 The question as to whether the facts
found to exist by the jury constitute adverse possession is a question
of law for the court.58
The courts have experienced much difficulty with the question as
to what intention a possessor must have in order to make hostile his
occupancy of land beyond his true boundary by mistake; and a conflict exists with reference to it. When, in situations other than that of
the erroneously located boundary, a possessor occupies one tract that

(dictum).
52Peyton v. Waters, 104 Kan. 81, 177 Pac. 525 (1919); Barron v. Federal Land
Bank, 182 Miss. 50, 180 So. 74 (1938); Kidd v. Browne, 200 Ala. 299, 303, 76 So.
65, 69 (1917) (dictum).
53Hoban v. Cable, 102 Mich. 206, 60 N.W. 466 (1894) (agreement to permit
occupancy of land in consideration of occupant's promise to pay taxes).
54 Jackson v. Sharp, 9 Johns. 163 (N.Y. 1892); Jackson v. Parker, 3 Johns. Cas.
124 (N.Y. 1802); accord, Jackson v. Thomas, 16 Johns. 292 (N.Y. 1819); Bordwell,
Disseisin and Adverse Possession, 33 YALE L.J. 141, 150 (1923).
5rSee, e.g., FLA. STAT. §95.13 (1953).
S6Murphy v. Leatherwood, 221 Ala. 61, 127 So. 843 (1930); Okeechobee Co. for
use of Highsmith v. Norton, 145 Fla. 417, 199 So. 319 (1940); Douglass v. Aidridge, 90 Fla. 51, 105 So. 145 (1925); Horton v. Smith-Richardson Inv. Co., 81 Fla.
255, 87 So. 905 (1921); Knight v. Denman, 64 Neb. 814, 90 N.W. 863 (1902),
aff'd on rehearing,68 Neb. 383, 94 N.W. 622 (1903).
57Murphy v. Leatherwood, supra note 56; Knight v. Denman, supra note 56;
cf. Horton v. Smith-Richardson Inv. Co., supra note 56.
58Cf. Horton v. Smith-Richardson Inv. Co., 81 Fla. 255, 87 So. 905 (1921).
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he does not own under the mistaken belief that it is another tract to
which he has title, or when he otherwise occupies land under the misconception that he owns it, his possession is hostile.59 Many cases
hold, too, that possession to a fence or line erroneously located beyond
the true boundary is adverse regardless of whether the possessor has
a consciously formulated intention to claim if necessary beyond his
true line.6o This view is consistent with the rule that prevails in other
instances of possession under a mistaken belief of ownership; and
there is no reason why the same rule should not be applied to a possession to a fence or line erroneously located beyond the true boundary. The better view 61 and probable weight of authority62 is that
it should.
Some cases apply this rule to the situation of the mistaken boundary even when the possessor testifies that he never intended to claim
more than he owned. 63 It has been held, too, that acquisition by adverse possession of the strip beyond the actual boundary is not prevented by an assertion of the possessor during the running of the statutory period that he does not want his neighbor's land, provided he
at no time concedes the possibility that his occupancy extends beyond
the land he owns.6 4
59E.g., McMillan v. Fuller, 41 App. D.C. 384 (1914); Goodno v. South Fla. Farms
Co., 95 Fla. 90, 116 So. 23 (1928); Rodgers v. Carpenter, 44 Nev. 4, 189 Pac. 67
(1920).
60Brantley v. Helton, 224 Ala. 93, 139 So. 283 (1932); Hoffman v. White, 90
Ala. 354, 7 So. 816 (1890); Shirey v. Whitlow, 80 Ark. 444, 97 S.W. 444 (1906);
Ahern v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 108 Conn. 1, 142 Atl. 400 (1928); French v. Pearce,
8 Conn. *439 (1831); Johnson v. Thomas, 23 App. D.C. 141 (1904); Bayhouse v.
Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, 105 Pac. 1066 (1909); Daily v. Boudreau, 231 Ill. 228, 83
N.E. 218 (1907); Turner v. Morgan, 158 Ky. 511, 165 S.W. 684 (1914); Milligan
v. Fritts, 226 Mo. 189, 125 S.W. 1101 (1910); Arnold v. Evans, 140 S.W. 497 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1911); Ovig v. Morrison, 142 Wis. 243, 125 N.W. 449 (1910); Rock Springs
v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 Pac. 908 (1929); cf. Mittet v. Hansen, 178 Wash. 541,
35 P.2d 93 (1934).
613 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §15.5 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 TIFFANY, LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY §1159 (3d ed. 1939); see Annot., 80 A.L.R. 155, 159 (1932).
62See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §15.5 (Casner ed. 1952); Annot., 33 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 923, 925 (1911).
63johnson v. Thomas, supra note 60; Daily v. Boudreau, supra note 60; Milligan v. Fritts, supra note 60; Arnold v. Evans, supra note 60; Mittet v. Hansen,
supra note 60; accord, Rock Springs v. Sturm, supra note 60.
64Van Allen v. Sweet, 239 Mass. 571, 132 N.E. 348 (1921); Davis v. Braswell, 185
Mo.. 576, 84 S.W. 870 (1904); Turner v. Morgan, 158 Ky. 511, 514, 165 S.W. 684,
685 (1914) (dictum).
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As indicated above, possession to an erroneously located fence or
line is adverse by the better view and probable weight of authority,
notwithstanding the absence of realization by the adverse possessor
of the possibility that the fence or line may be incorrect. Even courts
that take this position, however, hold that if the possessor regards the
fence or line as merely tentative or if he is aware that there may
be error in its location, his possession is not adverse unless he has a
consciously formulated intention to hold it even if it encroaches on
adjacent land. 5
Contrary to the general position set forth in the three preceding
paragraphs, a number of courts hold that hostility to the true title is
not established by a mere possession beyond the true boundary to an
erroneously located fence or line which the possessor mistakenly believes is the actual boundary. They take the position that for this
purpose the possession must be accompanied by an express claim
of ownership to the improperly placed fence or line or by acts such as
the making of improvements on the encroachment or the payment of
taxes on it, from which that claim can be implied.65 Some courts have
held that such a possession by mistake is not made adverse even by
the erection of a structure on or partially on the encroachment. 67 The
view taken by the cases cited in support of this paragraph is inconsistent with the rule prevailing in instances of possession under mistake other than that of the erroneously located boundary. Under
that rule such a possession normally is hostile without reinforcing accompaniments. There is no reason why that rule should not be applied in the case of a possession to a fence or line erroneously located
beyond the true boundary.
Preble v. Maine Central R.R. 68 is representative of a third group
of holdings with reference to the intention a possessor must have in
65Cf. Read v. Gilliam, 140 Ky. 824, 131 S.W. 1034 (1910); Brantley v. Helton,
224 Ala. 93, 96, 139 So. 283, 285 (1932) (dictum); Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo.
494, 510, 273 Pac. 908, 913 (1929) (dictum).
GoEvert v. Turner, 184 Iowa 1253, 169 N.W. 625 (1918); Grube v. Wells, 34
Iowa 148 (1872); accord, Harris v. Byrd, 202 Ala. 78, 79 So. 472 (1918); Brown v.
Cockerell, 33 Ala. 38 (1858); Riddle v. Sheppard, 119 Ga. 930, 47 S.E. 201 (1904);
Howard v. Reedy, 29 Ga. 152 (1859); Brunton v. Roberts, 265 Ky. 569, 97 S.W.2d
413 (1936) (cemetery lots); Brown v. Gay, 3 Greenl. 126 (Me. 1824); Davis v.
Furlow's Lessee, 27 Md. 536 (1867); St. Louis Univ. v. McCune, 28 Mo. 481 (1859);
Gilchrist v. McLaughlin, 29 N.C. 310 (1847).
67E.g., Winn v. Abeles, 35 Kan. 85 (1886).
6885 Me. 260, 27 Atl. 149 (1893).
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order to make hostile his occupancy of land beyond his true boundary.
It holds that when one occupies by mistake to a fence or line beyond
his actual boundary in the belief that it is the true line but without
the intention to claim title to that extent if it develops that the fence
or line encroaches on the adjacent land, his possession is not adverse.
It holds further, however, that if the possessor under such circumstances intends to claim to the fence or line whether it is correctly
or incorrectly located, his possession is adverse. Many cases take the
position of the Preble case in these respects. "
This view seems to require a consciously formulated intention
on the part of the possessor to claim to the fence or line if it encroaches on the neighboring land, as a prerequisite to obtaining title
to the encroachment by adverse possession. Apparently, therefore, to
acquire such title the possessor must consider the possibility that his
fence or line is incorrect. It follows that this view is inconsistent with
the rule that in instances of possession under mistake other than that
of an erroneously located boundary the possession can be adverse
even if the possessor has not thought of the possibility that he does
not own the land. It is undesirable, therefore, because no sufficient
ground exists for distinguishing possession under mistake beyond the
true boundary from other instances of possession under mistake.
The rule of the Preble case is also open to the objection that the
result reached is dependent on a subjective factor that usually is difficult to evaluate. In most instances of possession beyond the true line,
the possessor is unaware of the mistake during the running of all or
part of the statutory period. His possession in such a case is not adverse under the rule being considered; but when because of selfinterest he subsequently attempts to establish by false testimony that
he had the necessary intention during the running of the period, it is
difficult to ascertain whether he really did. In this connection the
70
following statement was made in French v. Pearce:
"I have been the more particular in my observations .. .
69E.g., Edwards v. Fleming, 83 Kan. 653, 112 Pac. 836 (1911); McWilliams v.
Samuel, 123 Mo. 659, 27 S.W. 550 (1894); Skanse v. Novak, 84 Wash. 39, 146 Pac.
160 (1915); accord, Dow v. McKenney, 64 Me. 138 (1875); Taylor v. Fomby, 116
Ala. 621, 626, 22 So. 910, 911 (1897) (dictum); Ricker v. Hibbard, 73 Me. 105. 106
(1881) (dictum); Worcester v. Lord, 56 Me. 265, 273 (1868) (dictum); Schaubuch
v. Dillemuth, 108 Va. 86, 89, 60 S.E. 745, 746 (1908) (dictum); cf. Miller v. Mills
County, 111 Iowa 654, 657, 82 N.W. 1038, 1039 (1900) (dictum).
708 Conn. 4*439, 446 (1831).
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from a serious apprehension that in the law of disseisin, an
important change is inadvertently attempted. Adopt the rule
that an entry and possession under a claim of right, if through
mistake, does not constitute an adverse possession, and a new
principle is substituted. The enquiry no longer is whether
visible possession, with the intent to possess, under a claim of
right, and to use and enjoy as one's own, is a disseisin; but from
this plain and easy standard of proof we are to depart, and the
invisible motives of the mind are to be explored."
The rule of the Preble case has been criticized, too, on the ground
that, although it permits tide to be gained by adverse possession
under mistake when the possessor has during the running of the
period the unworthy design to "steal," if necessary, a strip of his
neighbor's land, it denies it to him when during that period he fails
to think of what the result will be if he is encroaching on his neighbor.7 1 One who is willing to accept a strip of his neighbor's land as
the result of his theretofore innocent but wrongful possession may
ordinarily be deserving of no accolade for ethical conduct, but at
least he is no worse than the possessor who from the beginning contemplated the possibility of so acquiring ownership of land that was
not his. Since tide is perfected in instances of the latter type, it should
be in those of the former also.
The Florida cases announce a theory concerning the intention
necessary in the situation under consideration that varies from the
three views already presented. Thus in Bossom v. Gillman72 this
statement is made:
"In cases of mistake as to the true line between adjoining
lands, the real test as to whether or not a tide will be acquired
by a holding for a period of seven years, is the intention of the
party holding beyond the true line. If such occupation is by
mere mistake and with no intention upon the part of the occupant to claim, as his own, land which does not belong to him,
but he intends to claim only to the true line wherever it may
be, the holding is not adverse. If, however, the occupant takes
possession believing the land to be his own up to the mistaken
line and claiming title to it, and so holds, the holding is adverse."
71Ibid.; Johnson v. Thomas, 23 App. D.C. 141, 151 (1904).
7270 Fla. 310, 315, 70 So. 364, 366 (1915).
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The quoted statement is in practically the identical language of
headnote eight of Liddon v. Hodnett 7 3 a Florida case decided in 1886.
The headnote in turn is a condensation and combination of dicta and
quotations from authorities found in various portions of the case
to which it is appended.
In Kilgore v. Leafy74 a decree in favor of the original owner of the
disputed strip was reversed for further proceedings on the basis of
the rule as stated in the headnote of the Liddon case. In Surfside
Hotel, Inc. v. W. E. Moorehead, Inc.7 it was held on the authority
of Kilgore v. Leary that under the existing facts the possession of the
strip was adverse. The decision is consistent with the rule as stated
in the other cases, although the opinion does not set forth all of the
rule in the identical language previously used. In Shaw v. Williamsand Watrous v. Morrison- the rule as formulated in the Liddon
headnote is repeated as dictum in substantially its original form. In
Seymour and Simpson v. Creswell78 a dictum was enunciated to the
effect that when one unintentionally and by mistake occupies and actually improves land beyond his boundary, claiming and supposing
it to be his own, his possession is adverse. This statement is not in
the exact language of the rule announced several years later in the
Liddon headnote and does not embrace all phases of that rule. It is,
however, thoroughly consistent with the rule in question. The doctrine of the Liddon headnote, therefore, seems to be clearly established in the law of Florida.
Cases from several other jurisdictions 79 have applied the rule that
is in effect in Florida.
This writer must admit that he can find no authority that differentiates between the rule of Preble v. Maine Central R.R. and
the rule applied in Florida. Perhaps in thus distinguishing between
them he is making a shibboleth of mere words, heedless of the fact
that a court often declines to regard itself as committed by the language in which it has attempted to express the ratio decidendi of its
M

-322 Fla. 442 (1886).
74131 Fla. 715, 180 So. 35 (1938).
,5149 Fla. 397, 5 So.2d 857 (1942).
7650 So.2d 125, 127 (Fla. 1950).
7733 Fla. 261, 270, 14 So. 805, 808 (1894).
7818 Fla. 29, 36 (1881).
9Couch v. Adams, 111 Ark. 604, 164 S.W. 728 (1914); Goodwin v. Garibaldi. 83
Ark. 74, 102 S.W. 706 (1907); Goltermann v. Schiermeyer, 111 Mo. 404, 19 S.W.
484 (1892); cf. Peterson v. Hollis, 90 Kan. 655, 136 Pac. 258 (1913).
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prior decisions and also of Coleridge's pronouncement that "it is a
dull and obtuse mind that must divide in order to distinguish; but
it is a still worse that distinguishes in order to divide."
There is, however, a definite difference in the meaning of the two
rules as formulated. The inference of the rule of the Preble case is
that possession by mistake beyond the true boundary is not adverse
unless the possessor intends to hold to the line that he has established
even if it is incorrectly located. Such an intention, which involves a
conscious realization of the possibility of error in the extent of his
occupancy, is not required under the Florida rule that hostility of
possession is established by the occupant's taking possession with the
belief that the land is his up to the mistaken line and so holding under
a claim of title to that line.
To the extent that less emphasis is placed on the subjective under
the Florida rule than under that of the Preble case, the former is
preferable to the latter. The subjective element is, however, by no
means entirely eliminated by the Florida rule. Under that rule as
formulated, it remains to be ascertained whether the possessor is occupying with no intention to claim land that he does not own, or
whether he is in possession believing the land to be his up to the
mistaken line and holding to that point under a claim of title. In
most instances the possessor has during the running of the statutory
period given no thought to the nature of his claim. Even when he is
innocent of conscious perjury, however, he usually makes the response both on direct and cross-examination that advances his causeat least if he has been thoroughly instructed on the intricacies of the
Liddon headnote. With reference to such indefinite matters it is
easy to believe as one desires. Such testimony is not of the highest
order of credibility.
Unfortunately the decisions of a jurisdiction with reference to possession beyond the true line by mistake often are inconsistent.8 0
Sometimes a court has acknowledged this to be true of its own decisions. Thus in Riddle v. Sheppard"l the Supreme Court of Georgia
made this statement concerning the effect of a possession under a mistake as to the location of the true line:
804 TFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §1159 (3d ed. 1939). Compare Milligan
v. Fritts, 226 Mo. 189, 125 S.W. 1101 (1910), with McWilliams v. Samuel, 123 Mo.
659, 27 S.W. 550 (1894); and compare Brantley v. Helton, 224 Ala. 93, 139 So. 283
(1932), with Harris v. Byrd, 202 Ala. 78, 79 So. 472 (1918), and Brown v. Cockerell,

33 Ala. 38 (1858).
81119 Ga. 930, 933, 47 SE. 201,202 (1904).
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"Our own decisions do not seem to be in accord with each
other on this question. There are decisions which appear to
hold that possession under a mistake of fact as to the identity
of the land or the location of the boundary is not such adverse
possession as will . . . ripen into a prescriptive title . . . . In
Shiels v. Roberts . . . there was a distinct ruling that posses-

sion under a mistake of fact as to the true boundary was such
an adverse possession as would .

.

. ripen into a title."

Payment of Taxes as a Factor in Adverse Possession
In the absence of statute, the payment of taxes by the adverse
possessor is not a prerequisite to his perfecting title. 2 The payment
of or failure to pay taxes by the occupant, however, is of some evi83
dentiary value on the question as to whether his claim was hostile.
And in many jurisdictions statutes now make the payment of taxes
by the claimant essential to his acquisition of title by adverse possession or by specified kinds of adverse possession.8 4
No such requirement existed in Florida prior to June 5, 1939. On
that date the predecessors of the present sections 95.16 and 95.17
of Florida Statutes 1955 became effective. 5 They provided that the
possession of an occupant who held under color of title should not
be adverse unless he returned the property within a year after his
entry by its correct legal description to the assessor of the county in
which it was situated and paid all taxes and matured installments of
special improvement liens theretofore or thereafter levied before
they became delinquent. The present sections 95.18 and 95.19 of
Florida Statutes 1955, which also became effective on that date, established the same requirements with reference to adverse possession
without color of title. These new requirements were of course not
applicable to adverse possessions completed before the effective date
of the statutes. 86 They were applicable in part, however, to a sevenyear period of occupancy begun before June 5, 1939, but not completed until after that date. In Salls v. Martin8 7 the defendant, whose
82E.g., Kuh v. Flynn, 108 Neb. 798, 189 N.V. 280 (1922).

83Bush v. Griffin, 76 Neb. 214, 107 N.W. 247 (1906); Kuh v. Flynn, 108 Neb.
798, 801, 189 N.W. 280, 281, (1922) (dictum).

84Accord, Kuh v. Flynn, 108 Neb. 798, 801, 189 N.W. 280, 281 (1922) (dictum).
85Fla. Laws 1939, c. 19253, §§1, 2.
86Addis v. Hoagland, 150 Fla. 694, 8 So.2d 655 (1942); McKinnon v. Commerford, 88 So.2d 753, 755 (Fla. 1956) (dictum).
87156 Fla. 624, 24 So.2d 41 (1945).
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occupancy was of this type, neither returned the property to the assessor nor paid the taxes. He consequently did not acquire title by
adverse possession. In Palmer v. Green88 the defendant began his
possession in 1936 and continued it for a period in excess of seven
years without making a tax return or paying taxes. His failure to pay
taxes was held to prevent his possession from being adverse. It was
stated by the Court,89 however, that since the statute in question was
intended to have prospective application only, the defendant likely
was excused from performing those acts required to be -done within
a year after he went into possession.
The present sections 95.16, 95.17, and 95.27 of Florida Statutes
1955 became effective on June 11, 1945. Sections 95.16 and 95.17
eliminate the necessity for one who holds under color of title to return the property to the assessor and to pay taxes and special improvement liens as a prerequisite to acquiring title by adverse possession.90 Section 95.27 makes this elimination retroictive. It provides, however, that an owner whose land was thus caused retroactively
to have been held adversely by another during the period between
June 5, 1939, and June Il, 1945, should have until December 31, 1945,
in which to recover it.
In Indian Rocks Beach South Shore v. Ewell9- the Court, after
basing its decision primarily upon grounds that rendered inapplicable the occupant's claim of title by adverse possession, endeavored to
show that even aside from those grounds he had not obtained title
by adverse possession. In this attempt it took the position that an
adverse possession under color of title begun in 1938 and continued
until 1950 by an occupant who made no tax return and paid no
taxes would not perfect title. It stated that the only portion of the
time in question that could apply toward the necessary period of seven
years was the five years subsequent to the elimination on June 11,
1945, of the necessity of returning the property to the assessor and
paying taxes. It is submitted that the Court overlooked the fact that
the elimination under consideration was made retroactive by section
95.27 so that the time from June 5, 1939, to June 11, 1945, also could
have been applied to the statutory period. The original owner had
88159 Fla. 174, 31 So.2d 706 (1947).
s89d. at 179, 31 So.2d at 709.
90The performance of these acts is still required in the case of adverse possession without color of title. FLA. STAT. §§95.18-.19 (1955).
9159 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1952).
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not brought himself within the saving provision of that section by
seeking to recover his land on or prior to December 31, 1945.
One who encroaches upon land beyond his boundary ordinarily
does not have a written instrument or a judgment or decree purporting to vest in him the title to the encroachment. Normally, therefore, his possession is without color of title, and to perfect title his
acts must conform to the requirements of that type of adverse possession. In Florida, however, section 95.17 (2), which became effective on June 11, 1945, provides in effect that when one has color of
title to only part of the land protected by a substantial inclosure he
shall be deemed to have color of title to the remaining portion of the
contiguous land within the inclosure. Section 95.27 makes this innovation retroactive subject to the saving provision previously considered, which allowed an owner whose land was thus caused retroactively to have been held adversely between June 5, 1939, and June
11, 1945, until December 13, 1945, in which to recover it.
These provisions of course are not applicable to one who encroaches upon land beyond his boundary without inclosing by the
same substantial inclosure both the encroachment and the land to
which he has either actual title or mere color of title. In Holley v.
May,9 2 for example, a landowner occupied a strip beyond his boundary by mistake. He did not inclose the strip and his adjacent land. The
provision of section 95.17 (2), therefore, was not applicable to give
him color of title to the strip. Since his possession of the strip was
without color of title, his failure to pay taxes on it prevented him
from perfecting title to it by adverse possession.
When an encroacher makes an inclosure of the type under consideration, the provision of section 95.17 (2) applies, as does also in
a proper situation the retroactive provision of section 95.27. The
decision in Palmer v. Green, which has previously been discussed in
another connection, is not necessarily inconsistent with this conclusion. In that case a landowner began a possession beyond his true
line by mistake in 1936 and held possession of the encroachment
"under fence or substantial inclosure" for more than the statutory
period. The Supreme Court, without mentioning the June 11, 1945,
enactments, held that his failure to pay the taxes kept his possession
from being adverse. If the possessor merely protected the encroachment by a substantial inclosure without including in the inclosure
any land to which he had title or color of title, those enactments were
9275 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1954).
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inapplicable. Even if the inclosure included also land to which the
possessor had title or color of title, it is not unlikely, considering that
the case was decided by the Supreme Court in 1947, that the plaintiff
true owner brought his action for the land before December 31, 1945,
and thus came within the scope of the saving provision of section
95.27.
AGREEMENT OF OWNERS CONCERNING AN UNCERTAIN OR
DISPUTED BOUNDARY

When the boundary between contiguous lands is uncertain or disputed, and the owners of the lands agree, even orally, upon a certain
line as the permanent boundary and occupy to it as such, it becomes
binding on them as the boundary. This rule is recognized in Florida9 3
and elsewhere. 94 Such an agreement and occupancy is binding also on
the successors in title of the parties to the agreement both in Florida 9and in other jurisdictions.98 A mere oral agreement of this sort is
not binding even on the parties to the agreement, however, unless
it is followed by occupancy to the line.97
Possession for a short period to the line agreed upon is sufficient
to make its acceptance as the boundary conclusive, and there is no
9 3Williams v. Pichard, 150 Fla. 371, 7 So.2d 468 (1942); Board of Pub. Instr'n
v. Boehm, 138 Fla. 548, 189 So. 663 (1939); Shaw v. Williams, 60 So.2d 125, 126
(Fla. 1951) (dictum); Euse v. Gibbs, 49 So.2d 843, 846 '(Fla. 1951) (dictum); Palm
Orange Groves, Inc. v. Yelvington, 41 So.2d 883, 885 (Fla. 1949) (dictum); Kilgore
v. Leary, 131 Fla. 715, 718, 180 So. 35, 36 (1938) (dictum); Watrous v. Morrison,
33 Fla. 261,267, 14 So. 805, 807 (1894) (dictum).
04E.g., Wade v. McDougle, 59 W. Va. 113, 52 S.E. 1026 (1906); Robinson v.
Gaylord, 182 Ark. 849, 852, 33 S.W.2d 710, 711 (1930) (dictum); 2 TIFFANY, LAw OF
REAL PROPERTY §653

(3d ed. 1939); see Annot., 113 A.L.R. 423 (1938).

95Cf. Euse v. Gibbs, 49 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1951) (such an agreed line or a line
established by acquiescence is binding on the taxing authority even when the land
is assessed by its original description); Shaw v. Williams, 50 So.2d 125, 126 (Fla.
1951) (dictum); Palm Orange Groves, Inc. v. Yelvington, 41 So.2d 883, 885 (Fla.

1949) (dictum); Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 267, 14 So. 805, 807 (1894)
(dictum).
06E.g., Sobol v. Gulinson, 94 Colo. 92, 28 P.2d 810 (1933); cf. Jones v. Scott, 314

Ill. 118, 121, 145 N.E. 378, 380 (1924) (dictum); Berghoefer v. Frazier, 150 Ill. 577,
579, 37 N.E. 914 (1894)

(dictum); 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 94, §653; see

Annot., 113 A.L.R. 423 (1938).
97E.g., Berghoefer v. Frazier, 150 Ill. 577, 37 N.E. 914 (1894); Stone v. Richardson, 206 Iowa 419, 218 N.W 332 (1928); Hooper v. Herald, 154 Mich. 529, 118 N.W.
3 (1908).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol10/iss3/1

20

Day: The Validation of Erroneously Located Boundaries by Adverse Posse
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

necessity that the possession be continued for the period of the statute
of limitations. 9 8 For such an oral agreement to become binding it is
necessary that the location of the true boundary be unknown to the
parties at the time the agreement is entered into. 99 If the boundary
is known to them at that time, their oral agreement to locate it elsewhere is void as an attempt to convey the strip between the true
boundary and the agreed line without complying with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds or the conveyancing act of the jurisdiction. 100 If the boundary is actually unknown to them, however,
the situation is not brought within the scope of the rule last stated
by the fact that it could have been ascertained by an expensive survey
or otherwise.10 1
VALIDATION BY ACQUIESCENCE

Acquiescence by the owners of adjoining tracts of land in the
recognition of an erroneously located line as the boundary between
their properties can under proper circumstances establish that line
as the actual boundary.1°2 It has been correctly stated that a consideration of the relevant holdings in the jurisdictions of the United
States establishes that the doctrine of acquiescence is in a chaotic
condition.103 The doctrine is distinct from that of acquiring title to
the disputed strip by adverse possession and that of the establishment
of an erroneous line as the boundary by an oral agreement followed
by possession to the line thus fixed.104 The confusion that exists concerning acquiescence has been engendered in part by the frequent
failure of the courts to differentiate it from these other doctrines and
9SRobinson v. Gaylord, 182 Ark. 849, 852, 33 S.W.2d 710, 711 (1930) (dictum);
Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 269, 14 So. 805, 808 (1894) (dictum); Wade v.
McDougle, 59 W. Va. 113, 122, 52 S.E. 1026, 1030 (1906)

(dictum); cf. Board of

Pub. Instr'n v. Boehm, 138 Fla. 548, 553, 189 So. 663, 665 (1939) (dictum).
99E.g., Jones v. Scott, 314 111. 118, 145 N.E. 378 (1924); Watrous v. Morrison,
33 Fla. 261, 270, 14 So. 805, 808 (1894) (dictum).
100E.g., Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912 (1928); Watrous v. Morrison,
supra note 99.
101E.g., Sobol v. Gulinson, 94 Colo. 92, 28 P.2d 810 (1933).
102E.g., Palm Orange Groves, Inc. v. Yelvington, 41 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1949); Acosta
v. Gingles, 70 Fla. 13, 69 So. 717 (1915).
lOSAnnot., 69 A.L.R. 1430, 1431 (1930); see also Annot., 113 A.L.R. 421, 422
(1938); 2 TIFFANY, supra note 94, §§653-54.
104Cf., e.g., Board of Pub. Instr'n v. Boehm, 138 Fla. 548, 189 So. 663 (1939);
Edmunds v. Sughrow, 233 Mich. 400, 403, 206 N.W. 309, 310 (1925) (dictum).
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to distinguish situations to which it is applicable from those in which
estoppel is the controlling factor. 0 5 In spite of this confusion, however, certain principles, as applied in a given jurisdiction at least,
can be deduced with reasonable assurance from the decisions.
It has been held in Florida 0 6 and in some other jurisdictions' 0
that the acquisition of title by acquiescence requires some dispute as
to the boundary from which there can be implied a cognizance on
the part of both of the adjoining owners that the proper boundary
line is in doubt. In some jurisdictions, however, it is held in this
connection merely that the location of the true line must be uncertain
or in dispute; 0 8 and in some it is held that neither uncertainty nor
dispute is necessary. 01
In order for a line to be established against an individual by his
acquiescence, he must know that his neighbor is occupying to the
line in question as a boundary rather than for mere convenience." 0
Furthermore, the acquiescence of the individual whose land is encroached upon must continue for a period at least equal to that of
the statute of limitations."' It is stated in Palm Orange Groves, Inc.
v. Yelvington'" and Shaw v. Williams 13 that this rule prevails in
Florida. In Board of Public Instruction v. Boehm" 4 it is said in
losSee note 103 supra.
c06Holley v. May, 75 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1954); cf. Shaw v. Williams, 50 So.2d 125
(Fla. 1951).
107E.g., Griffin v. Brown, 167 Iowa 599, 149 N.W. 833 (1914).
108E.g., Edmunds v. Sughrow, 233 Mich. 400, 206 N.W. 309 (1925); Hakanson
v. Manders, 158 Neb. 392, 396, 63 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1954) (dictum).
109E.g., Woodburn v. Grimes, 58 N.M. 717, 275 P.2d 850 (1954); Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 27, 232 P.2d 202, 208 (1951) (dictum).
'lOEggers v. Mitchem, 239 Iowa 1211, 34 N.W.2d 603 (1948); Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954); Nelson v. Da Rouch, 87 Utah 457, 50
P.2d 273 (1935); accord, Maes v. Olmsted, 247 Mich. 180, 225 N.W. 583 (1929).
1Oliver v. Oliver, 187 Ala. 340, 65 So. 373 (1914); Wheatley v. San Pedro, L.A.
S.L.R.R., 169 Cal. 505, 147 Pac. 135 (1915); Bjerketvedt v. Jacobson, 232 Minn.
152, 44 N.W.2d 775 (1950); Bichler v. Ternes, 63 N.D. 295, 248 N.W. 185 (1933);
Wilp v. Magnes, 204 Okla. 448, 230 P.2d 733 (1951); Kinkade v. Simpson, 200 OkIa.
507, 197 P.2d 968 (1948); Anderson v. Atlantic Oil Produdng Co., 83 S.W.2d 418
(rex. Civ. App. 1935); Scott v. Slater, 42 Wash.2d 366, 255 P.2d 377 (1953); State
v. Vanderkoppel, 45 Wyo. 432, 19 P.2d 955 (1933); accord, Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Selnes, 223 Minn. 518, 27 N.W.2d 553 (1947); see Annot., 113 A.L.R. 421, 435

(1938).
11241 So.2d 883, 885 (Fla: 1949).
1150 So.2d 125,126 (Fla. 1951).
14138 Fla. 548, 553, 189 So. 663, 665 (1939).
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effect that to establish a boundary by acquiescence alone "there must
be actual possession up to the line by the party claiming the benefit
thereof for a time sufficient in duration to warrant the inference or
presumption of a former agreement establishing a delimitation of
the boundary." It is believed that the latter statement is to be reconciled with the former one by holding that the time sufficient to warrant the inference referred to is the period of the statute of limitations.
Although a title cannot be acquired against the state by adverse
possession,115 it is held in Floridala and some other jurisdictions-ll that the state can be bound as freely as an individual by its
acquiescence in the possession of a neighboring proprietor up to an
encroaching line. In some jurisdictions, however, it is held that
acquiescence does not bind the state" 8 and is not applicable to preclude a county or other governmental agency in a highway boundary
dispute.""'

The doctrine of acquiescence is, theoretically at least, of the most
significance when the facts to which it is applied are such as to come
within its scope, although they are insufficient to permit the sustaining of the erroneously located fence or line as the boundary on
the basis of either adverse possession or a parol agreement fixing the
boundary followed by occupancy to it. Recourse can be had to this
doctrine to sustain the passing of title to the encroachment in certain instances in which the possessor does not have the intention
necessary to satisfy the requirements of his jurisdiction with reference to perfecting title to the strip by adverse possession.12o Similarly, it can be employed to sustain such passing of title in some situations in which there is no oral agreement fixing the boundary.21
And, as stated in the preceding paragraph, acquiescence precludes
the state in Florida and some other jurisdictions, although adverse
possession does not. Furthermore, it neither is nor has been a prerequisite to the establishment of an erroneous line as the boundary

by acquiescence that the possessor return the encroachment for taxation and pay taxes on it. As has been indicated, the statutes of Flor115E.g., FLA. STAT.

§§95.02,

.15 (1955).

"16Cf. Board of Pub. Instr'n v. Boehm, 138 Fla. 548, 189 So. 663 (1939).
117E.g., Iowa v. Carr, 191 Fed. 257 (8th Cir. 1911).
11SE.g., Garcia v. State, 274 S.W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
ll9Langle v. Brauch, 193 Iowa 140, 185 N.W. 28 (1922).
120Cf. Board of Pub. Instr'n v. Boehm, 138 Fla. 548, 189 So. 663 (1939).

1211bid.
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ida have since 1939 required the performance of these duties under
varying circumstances by one who would acquire title by adverse possession.
In most of the decisions in which acquiescence is mentioned, however, the courts do not rely upon that doctrine alone. Often a court,
after recognizing that the existing facts justify the establishment of an
erroneous line as the boundary on the basis of a parol agreement
followed by occupancy to the line, or of adverse possession to the line,
or both, seeks to reinforce its holding by stressing the continuance of
122
acquiescence for many years.
Even when a decision is placed solely on the ground of acquiescence, the facts frequently are such that it could have been based on
one or both of the other doctrines. In the Florida case of Acosta v.
Gingles,23 for example, a father had conveyed a tract of land to his
three daughters - the plaintiff, the defendant, and their sister - as
co-owners by a description that failed, apparently because of a mistake, to include an additional thirty-five feet on the south that he
owned. The grantees, evidently believing that this strip was included
in their conveyance, agreed that the land should be divided into
halves; that the plaintiff should take the south half and the defendant
the north half, on which there were valuable improvements; that, in
accordance with evaluations already placed on the tract by disinterested persons, the defendant should pay to the third sister the value
of her third interest in the whole and to the plaintiff a further sum
to compensate her for the fact that the south half was unimproved.
With the consent of the plaintiff and the defendant, a fence was
erected to make the division, and deeds intended to carry out the
agreement were executed. These deeds, which neither referred to
the fence as a boundary nor included the thirty-five feet on the south
that the sisters erroneously thought they had received from their
father, vested in the defendant and the plaintiff, respectively, the north
half and the south half of the tract actually conveyed to the sisters by
their father. Because of the mistake as to the extent of their ownership, the fence was placed twenty-seven feet south of the mid-point of
the land described in the various conveyances. After the plaintiff
and the defendant had for twenty-five years recognized the fence as
the boundary between their portions and had improved their respective allotments by setting out fruit trees, the plaintiff sought to eject
22See, e.g., Euse v. Gibbs, 49 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1951).
12370 Fla. 19, 69 So. 717 (1915).
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the defendant from the twenty-seven feet north of the fence. In denying the plaintiff this relief, the Court stated that the question was
not one of mistaken boundary or adverse possession but that the
parties had agreed upon the fence as the line and had acquiesced in
its recognition as such for twenty-five years. It also added that they
were estopped to dispute the line by the fact that it was established
in connection with the settlement made on the basis of the valuations placed on the two portions and by the further fact that each
had planted fruit trees on her portion. Although the Court did not
place its decision on the ground that the fence was agreed upon as
the location of an uncertain line and that the parties had occupied
the land to the fence as a boundary, the decision could have been
sustained on that basis.
Similarly, in Palm Orange Groves, Inc. v. Yelvington124 the Florida
Court, after deciding the case primarily upon a ground not under
consideration here, stated in effect that, even if the facts should be
found so to exist that that ground became irrelevant, the erroneous
line still would be established as the boundary by acquiescence. No
mention was made of acquisition of title to the erroneous line by
adverse possession. If the situation thus somewhat hypothetically presented was sufficient to justify the application of the doctrine of acquiescence in the existing setting, however, it would seem that it
was sufficient also to satisfy the requirements for perfecting title by
adverse possession.
The vast preponderance of the decisions based on acquiescence
are those in which either the holding is expressly placed also on one
or both of the other doctrines or the facts are such that the holding
could have been so sustained. This is true to an extent that suggests
that the courts are more disposed to rely upon acquiescence in such instances than in situations involving acquiescence alone.

12441

So.2d 883 (Fla. 1949).
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